620 / 2024-04-28 08:57:10

Research on carbon emission misreporting behavior in supply chain under carbon quota mechanism: Punishment vs. Incentive?

low-carbon supply chain;,carbon quota mechanism,carbon emission;,misreporting behavior

In the low-carbon supply chain under the carbon quota mechanism, aiming at the situation that the manufacturer may profit from private carbon emission information, this paper discusses the triggering conditions of the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, examines the impact of the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior on the main performance indicators of supply chain. Then, we design punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism to deal with manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, and analyze the applicable scenarios of the punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism. The results show that: (1) The manufacturer’s misreporting behavior is closely related to carbon trading price and carbon quota ratio. The higher the carbon trading price and the larger the carbon quota ratio, the more likely the manufacturer is to “overreport”. (2) The punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism must meet certain conditions to effectively restrain the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, and the higher the carbon trading price, the lower the effectiveness of punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism. (3) When the manufacturer overreports, the punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism are applied in different situations. In most cases, punishment mechanism is more conducive to reducing total carbon emissions, while consumer surplus of incentive mechanism is higher when the carbon trading price is low. Regardless of the carbon trading price, the cost of carbon governance under punishment mechanism is always higher than that under incentive mechanism.

In the low-carbon supply chain under the carbon quota mechanism, aiming at the situation that the manufacturer may profit from private carbon emission information, this paper discusses the triggering conditions of the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, examines the impact of the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior on the main performance indicators of supply chain. Then, we design punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism to deal with manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, and analyze the applicable scenarios of the punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism. The results show that: (1) The manufacturer’s misreporting behavior is closely related to carbon trading price and carbon quota ratio. The higher the carbon trading price and the larger the carbon quota ratio, the more likely the manufacturer is to “overreport”. (2) The punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism must meet certain conditions to effectively restrain the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior, and the higher the carbon trading price, the lower the effectiveness of punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism. (3) When the manufacturer overreports, the punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism are applied in different situations. In most cases, punishment mechanism is more conducive to reducing total carbon emissions, while consumer surplus of incentive mechanism is higher when the carbon trading price is low. Regardless of the carbon trading price, the cost of carbon governance under punishment mechanism is always higher than that under incentive mechanism.