606 / 2024-04-26 22:33:36

Manufacturer or retailer? When cause marketing undertaking modes meet asymmetric consumers' prosociality level information

Game theory, Information sharing, Cause marketing, Consumer prosociality, Pricing

Enterprises often launch cause marketing campaigns to stimulate customer demand. We investigate an information game of cause marketing between a manufacturer and a retailer that owns private information on consumers' prosociality level. We consider both cases where the manufacturer leads the cause marketing (the M-led mode) and the retailer leads the cause marketing (the R-led mode). We find that the retailer's information sharing strategy hinges on the expectation and uncertainty degree of consumers' prosociality level in the M-led mode, and information disclosure occurs only when the market condition is unfavourable to the manufacturer. Information sharing always benefits the manufacturer and the supply chain. In the R-led mode, the retailer always conceals the information that is beneficial to the supply chain but detrimental to the manufacturer. Moreover, the R-led mode always outperforms the M-led mode in respect of the retailer, supply chain, and social impact. Information sharing can lead to Pareto improvement of the supply chain under favourable market condition. However, the manufacturer prefers the M-led mode under unfavorable market condition and the R-led mode under favourable market condition.