Under the framework of the double integral policy, this paper constructs four different differential game models for the capital constraints existing in the new energy vehicles supply chain, explores the impact of the supplier’s capital constraints on the innovation level and profits of the new energy vehicles supply chain, and proposes two financing strategies, bank loans and sharing the cost with manufacture, to improve the supplier’s capital constraints. It is found that the supplier’s capital constraint reduces the innovation level and profit of supply chain. The less self-owned capital, the lower the innovation level and profit of supply chain. When the loan interest rate is higher than a certain value, the bank loans strategy cannot alleviate the capital constraint, while sharing the cost with manufacture strategy can always alleviate the capital constraint. The choice of the optimal strategy depends on the relationship between the supplier’s own capital and the loan interest rate: given the loan interest rate, when the supplier’s own capital is greater than a certain threshold, sharing the cost with manufactures strategy can bring greater innovation level and profit, and the bank loan strategy is chosen otherwise.