MaPeng / Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell the remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM’s new products (i.e., the competition mode). What’s more, considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR’s limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR’s optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. The results show that when the blockchain service is relatively cheap, it makes sense for the TPR to opt for the cooperation mode and to receive financing from the OEM. Otherwise, the TPR’s choice of the competition mode and financing from the bank is the optimal decision. Besides, when the TPR chooses the competition mode, no matter how the unit blockchain usage changes and which financing strategy the TPR chooses, blockchain can always bring benefits for both members and the channel. Furthermore, we also find that when the TPR chooses trade credit under the cooperation mode, it can lead to the lowest environmental impact and the highest social welfare among the four models.