Land trusteeship is an emerging agricultural operational mode to enhance agricultural productivity and promote sustainable agricultural development. Within this framework, farmers function as the demanders of trusteeship services, the agricultural service company (ASC) serves as the service provider, and the village collective plays a pivotal intermediary role, bridging the interaction between the involved parties. However, the lack of a well-defined pricing mechanism for trusteeship services constitutes a critical obstacle hindering the widespread promotion of land trusteeship projects. In practice, certain projects adopt the ASC-paid coordination fee mode (AP mode), while others adopt the farmer-paid coordination fee mode (FP mode). To comprehend the pricing mechanisms underlying these two modes, we establish pricing frameworks for each rooted in the Stackelberg game theory, incorporating the impact of digital technologies on soil quality. Subsequently, we analyze the performance of both modes in terms of economic profit and environmental sustainability. We find that the ASC achieves higher profits under the FP mode, whereas the village collective obtains greater profits under the AP mode. Regarding project performance, the AP mode yields more profits, while the FP mode contributes to greater environmental enhancement. Finally, we enhance the AP mode and develop the modified AP mode (MAP mode). The results indicate that when farmers' environmental awareness is high and the cost of digital technology is low, the MAP mode can achieve a win-win-win outcome for the ASC, village collective, and the project performance both in economic and environmental aspects.