394 / 2024-04-24 21:52:56
Information provision strategy under consumer valuation uncertainty
Valuation uncertainty; Product returns; Information provision; Reference-dependence.
摘要待审
FatongShi / Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
TingtingLi / Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
Consumers often exhibit considerable valuation uncertainty in online shopping. When the uncertainty is resolved after purchase, they may choose to return the products. To mitigate this uncertainty and reduce consumer returns, some retailers provide additional pre-purchase information to consumers. Furthermore, consumers often discover that the actual utility of products after purchase deviates from their pre-purchase expectations, which results in a loss/gain in their perceived utility. Such behavior is referred to as reference-dependence. In this paper, we consider a monopolistic online retailer selling products to consumers with valuation uncertainty. The retailer can provide uncertainty-reducing information to the consumers and they receive an imperfect signal indicating their true valuation type. We first analyze the retailer's optimal selling price and information provision strategy when the consumers are rational (i.e., without reference-dependent behavior). Then we extend the analysis to the case when the consumers are reference-dependent. We find that the retailer's optimal information provision strategy mainly depends on the valuation heterogeneity of consumers, the proportions of different valuation type and the signal quality. Especially, the retailer will not always provide information, even if information provision is cost-less. Furthermore, when facing rational consumers, if the optimal strategy is to provide information, more information is better. When facing reference-dependent consumers, providing information may be detrimental to the retailer. In addition, we also find that information provision of the retailer, which attempts to reduce returns, may actually increase returns. Specifically, the uncertainty-reducing information does not affect the return decision of rational consumers, while it may increase the returns of reference-dependent consumers.

 
重要日期
  • 会议日期

    06月28日

    2024

    07月01日

    2024

  • 07月01日 2024

    注册截止日期

主办单位
中国科学技术大学
协办单位
管理科学与工程学会
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