Many multinational manufacturers are establishing global distribution channels and often adapt their pricing strategies to the purchasing power of consumers across different nations. However, such price discrepancies have given rise to the emergence of unauthorized parallel import channels. Unlike purchases made through authorized official resale channels, customers who choose parallel import channels may be subject to import duties and extended waiting times. Parallel import retailers commonly employ two import duty payment strategies: one integrates import duties into the retail price (known as the duty-inclusive strategy), while the other separates import duties from retail prices, requiring customers to settle import duties only when their purchases are taxed by customs (known as the duty-recovery strategy). Despite its practical significance, this issue remains underexplored in existing literature. In this study, we developed a game theory model to investigate the impact of different import duty payment strategies adopted by parallel import retailers. Our analysis yields three main findings. Firstly, when the parallel import retailer adopts the duty-recovery strategy, the official resale channel and the parallel import channel can coexist only when the frequency of customs inspections is relatively high, triggering a pattern of dual-channel competition. Otherwise, it may lead to a monopolistic scenario for the parallel import retailer. Secondly, when the extra waiting time is moderate, the duty-inclusive strategy can create an all-win situation for the three parties. Thirdly, the duty-recovery strategy affords consumers the opportunity to not paying import duties. However, this is not always beneficial to consumers. As the extra waiting time increases, the duty-recovery may begin to reduce the actual benefits to consumers, gradually becoming less advantageous. Our findings offer valuable insights into the import duty payment strategies of parallel import retailers and their implications for various stakeholders.