This paper studies two difffferent showroom strategies for the online retailer—independent showroom (IS) strategy that the online retailer opens and operates the showroom by itself and cooperated showroom (CS) strategy that the online retailer showcases products in a brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer's store. Tow retailers are asymmetric in product information delivery, which can be eliminated by CS and IS. If the asymmetry is eliminated, the BM retailer will suffffer a cannibalization risk, while the online retailer will expand the market. When consumers get more information benefifit from the physical inspection, the cannibalization and expansion effffects are both strengthened. The difffference between CS and IS is that, CS exposes more products to consumers in one common store, which changes consumer preference learning behavior. Considering these impacts of showroom strategies, we develop pricing game models to study the online retailer’ optimal showroom strategy and BM retailer's responses. Results show that, CS performs better than IS for the online retailer if there is no information commission. So whether CS can be implemented depends on the BM retailer’s cooperation intentions. When consumers get more information benefifit from physical inspection, the online retailer has more incentives to open the physical showroom. To prevent the online retailer from adopting IS, the BM retailer is willing to participate in cooperate even if there is no information commission. However, when consumers get less information benefifit, the online retailer has less incentives to open the showroom. The BM retailer also has less incentives to participate cooperation especially when consumers are less uncertain about

preferences. Because the positive preference learning effffect is diffiffifficult to exceed the negative cannibalization effffect, NS strategy (the online retailer does not open the showroom) might become an equilibrium. If the online retailer needs to pay high information commission to the BM retailer, IS strategy is optimal when consumers get more information benefifit from the physical inspection but are less uncertain about there preferences. When consumers get less information benefifit, CS strategy will be optimal only if the information commission is moderate, otherwise, NS strategy is optimal.