Optimizing Elderly Service Supply Chains: Exploring the Role of Government Subsidy and a Dual-Purpose Elderly Service Integrator in Healthcare Innovation
elderly service supply chain, dual-purpose, subsidy policy, corporate social responsibility
In the face of a growing aging population, ensuring the sustainable development of elderly service supply chains has become a collective priority for governments and businesses alike. This research delves into the nuanced impact of two pivotal intervention policies—consumer subsidy and provider subsidy—on the dual-purpose Elderly Service Integrator (ESI) by using a Stackelberg game framework. Our key findings underscore that when the ESI incorporates consumer surplus into its considerations, it contributes to elevated service quality compared to a for-profit supply chain. Furthermore, achieving Pareto optimality for both the ESI and the Elderly Service Provider (ESP) becomes feasible when the ESI’s emphasis on consumer surplus and government subsidy level reach a specific threshold. Notably, for an equivalent total subsidy amount, a provider subsidy policy outperforms a consumer subsidy policy in enhancing service quality. Under a provider subsidy policy, the ESI’s profit margins increase, while the ESP experiences greater profitability under a consumer subsidy policy. We also provide nuanced policy recommendations for governmental bodies. Specifically, when the government provides substantial subsidies to ESP and the dual-purpose ESI does not sufficiently prioritize consumer surplus, maximizing ESI profits instead becomes a powerful driver for improving social utility.