摘要详情
185 / 2024-04-22 20:27:45
Quality certification of online retail platform under heterogeneous manufacturers
supply chain management,quality certification,retailing platforms,game theory
摘要待审
As a major instrument of quality assurance implemented in online business, quality certifications play pivotal roles in retailing platforms’ operations. This paper studies whether retailing platforms can improve the product quality of sellers (manufacturers) through implementing quality certifications. We develop a game-theoretic model which consists of one retailing platform and two competing manufacturers with differentiated brand positioning. Considering the platform can flexibly set the quality standard, we explore the quality certification for the platform where the quality and price decisions of the heterogeneous manufacturers can be affected. We find that the implementation of the certification is not always profitable for the platform. Specifically, when the certification cost coefficient is low (high), the certification is profitable (unprofitable) for platform. Moreover, when implementing the certification, the platform may prefer to only encourage the high-end manufacturer to participate in the certification, as the participation of the low-end manufacturer could be unprofitable for the platform. More interestingly, we find that the effects of the introduction of quality certification are two-fold. It enhances the price and quality of the participant while incentivizing the non-participant to degrade its product price and quality. Thus, the certification expands the vertical differential of the products sold via the platform. Finally, the robustness of the results established in the main model is validated in other extensions including linear certification costs, the impact of platform commission fees and unit traveling cost.
重要日期
-
会议日期
06月28日
2024
至07月01日
2024
-
07月01日 2024
注册截止日期
主办单位
中国科学技术大学
协办单位
管理科学与工程学会
联系方式
- 蔡雨汀
- po******@ustc.edu.cn
- 187********
