QinJuanjuan / Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
YangWenjing / Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
WangJun / Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Expanding on the single-channel resale model, adding an agency model doesn't just increase the product's sales outlets but also intensifies market competition. This article creates a supply chain structure involving manufacturers dealing with financial constraints and e-commerce platforms having enough capital. By using signaling game methodology, it mainly investigates if a financially restricted supply chain, with symmetric or asymmetric information on manufacturing costs, requires blending an agency model with the single-channel resale strategy. Research suggests that when there's balanced information and reasonable production costs, both manufacturers and e-commerce platforms benefit from adopting the agency model. Initially, they tend to combine it with direct resale. However, as loan rates increase, their interest in the agency model fluctuates. In scenarios of information inequality, manufacturers imitate each other in various ways. If both types imitate each other, they might set mixed prices for maximum profit. Comparison shows that the agency model is advantageous when high-type imitates low-type or when both types imitate each other, given specific production costs. In such cases, both manufacturers and e-commerce platforms prefer the agency model alongside direct resale.